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Abstract
Japan, the third-largest economy in the world, is facing 
the sense of stagnation; hopelessness amid capitalist 
prosperity and flood of consumerist and pop cultures. 
Anne Allison recently called it “Precarious Japan” while 
Alexandre Kojève already identified it as a form of life 
after “the end of history” decades ago. This paper aimed 
to theoretically investigate the current Japanese social 
and mental situation, and develop a social-theoretical 
framework to elucidate it based on an integrated 
contemporary interpretation of Hegelian and Marxian 
concepts on human-being: the negativity, and   socio-
economic stages: the rise of organic composition of 
capital (OCC). The author constructed a  following 
hypothesis as a conclusion. Through the rise of the OCC, 
the social character of labor is formed and developed not 
only in terms of the mental aspects of labor, but also as a 
source of social and historic imagination, in accordance 
with the development of capitalism. However, in a 
region like Japan where geographical movement of labor 
force over its boarders does not occur, instead of being 
1 The author made a presentation on this project at the Critical 
Historical Studies Conference (University of Chicago) in December 
2011, and also has already published the Japanese abbreviated 
version of this paper on Shakai Riron Kenkyuu (Journal of Social 
Theory) No.14 from Shakai Riron Gakkai (International Society of 
Social Theory) in December 2013, in which the detailed depictions 
of the current situation of Japanese society are trimmed down based 
on the readers’ background knowledge and understanding. 
exercised as a social and historic imagination toward a 
hopeful future vision, this faculty is fulfilled as: romantic 
imagination which goes introspectively, to a further dive 
into the interiority; or retrospectively, toward a nostalgic 
beautification of the past. An expression of this is the 
rise of the sphere of subculture in Japanese society. This 
could be regarded as a precursory symptom for developed 
capitalist countries.
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1.  HOPE IS LOST, YET WHERE IS THE 
MULTITUDE?
“This country has everything. You can find whatever 
you want here. The only thing you can’t find is hope.”2 
These words are spoken about Japan by the protagonist 
in Ryu Murakami’s novel Exodus to a Country of Hope 
(Kibou no Kuni no Ekusodasu), a middle-school student 
who has been summoned in front of a Japanese Parliment 
Lower House Budget Committee meeting as an unsworn 
2 Ryu Murakami, Kibou no Kuni no Ekusodasu, Bunshun Bunko, 
2002, p. 314 (the first edition was published from Bugei-Shunjuu-
sha in 2000). This novel is currently not available in English, but 
you can find Murakami’s comments on 2011 Tōhoku earthquake 
and tsunami in Japan in the following article, in which he mentioned 
this novel. “Amid Shortages, a Surplus of Hope”, The New York 
Times, March 16, 2011 (http://www. nytimes.com/2011/03/17/
opinion/17Murakami.html?_r=1)
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witness. In the novel set in the year 2001-2008, (mainly) 
middle school age juveniles are in dispair over their 
dysfunctional, obsolescent school education system, 
which is completely out-of-synch with contemporary 
Japan. They initiate “school refusals” (long-term truancy) 
on a massive scale – hundreds of thousands of students – 
and, using the internet to organize students nationally, go 
into business for themselves. These young entrepreneurs 
proceed to build their own futures, initially beginning with 
businesses such as environmental, community support, 
and nursing care fields, and later getting to the point 
where they establish an original local currency sphere on 
Hokkaido island, acquring vast fortunes from currency 
trading via hedge funds. Murakami’s novel is based on his 
own minute and comprehensive research, and his sober 
awareness of the actual status of Japan’s stalling society. 
He poignantly depicts, with a touch of detached realism: 
a) the undercurrents of a Japanese society which cannot 
reconstitute itself in correspondence with the fluidity of 
globalized capital, and b) the abyssal depths of a sense of 
stagnation of the younger generation in Japan, trapped in 
a no exit situation.
Of course, Exodus to a Country of Hope was fiction, 
but there is a non-fictional critical essay by Tomohiro 
Akagi from 2007 that expresses a similar sense of 
stagnation among younger generations, consequently 
causing quite a stir in Japan, titled: “I want to slap Masao 
Maruyama3: A freeter4, 31 years old, and I hope for war”5. 
The thrust of this essay is its stark portrayal of the ennui 
of a young Japanese man in his early 30s who graduated 
from college during the “the employment ice age (1993-
2005)”6, tried to get a job with permanent employment 
at different general companies, but failed. He has been 
working as “freeter” during night shifts, earning $1000 per 
month – not enough to enable him strike out from home 
and become independent from his parents. He feels there 
are no prospects for a dramatic change in the course of his 
life, and no hope for having his own family and children. 
3 Masao Maruyama (1914-1996) was a leading Japanese political 
scientist and political theorist. In March 1945, Maruyama was drafted 
and stationed as a private in the Japanese army at Hiroshima, although 
he was already an assistant professor at Tokyo University. The author, 
Akagi, is trying to convey that he admires the social mobility made 
possible during war time, in which even an elite Tokyo University 
professor could be slapped by superiors in the army. 
4 “Freeter” is a Japanese expression for people between the ages 
of 15 and 34 who lack full time employment or are unemployed 
(excluding housewives and students). 
5 Tomohiro Akagi, Maruyama Masao wo hippatakitai, 31 sai, 
freeter, kibou ha sensou, in Ronza, January 2007, Asahi Shinbunsha.
6 “The collapse of the asset bubble in the early 1990s and fallout 
from the technology burst in 2000 created what people in Japan 
call a hiring ‘ice age’ that forced the students who couldn’t secure 
work to hop between temporary jobs. The proportion of non-
regular workers more than doubled between 1985 and 2008.” 
(“Japan ‘Ice Age’ Returns as Student Joblessness Soars to Record”, 
Bloomberg, March 12, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aSj9Cvt0AZHg)
Akagi argues that Japanese society today provides 
everyone with a peaceful and stable life, without material 
hardship, but that this very situation is humiliating, and 
devoid of dignity and dreams – a spiritual hell. While 
retirees older than the “baby boomers” enjoy a leisurely 
life, the distortions of Japanese society are fobbed off on 
younger generations, who toil in a tenuous post bubble 
economy era where one false step could send them 
plunging headfirst into a no exit quagmire. This situation 
led Akagi, cursing the injustice between generations, to 
confess he hopes that war will break out, if only for its 
potential to enable social mobility.
It is not yet clear whether such a sense of stagnation, 
hopelessness, and disengagement from society – 
predominantly centered around younger generations – 
leads to any actual, concrete social crisis. The “Akihabara 
massacre”7 and other copycat cases that followed on its 
heels have been considered instances of this kind of sense 
of stagnation unleashed in the form of individual antisocial 
violence. Some who are hindered from self-realization 
in the real world production and reproduction process 
are pushed into unstable employment circumstances, and 
others become school refusers, or even hikikomori8 – 
losing their energy to venture out into the world. According 
to a survey, many Japanese high school students tend to 
suffer from acute depression, low motivation, and have a 
significantly low level of self-esteem9.
7 “The Akihabara massacre” was an incident of mass murder that 
took place on Sunday, June 8, 2008, in the Akihabara shopping 
district (for electronics, video games, and comics), the Mecca of 
otaku (obsessed hobbyists). The suspect, Tomohiro Kato, 25, hit 
a crowd in a pedestrian mall with a 2 ton rented truck, eventually 
killing three people and injuring two; he then stabbed at least 12 
people using a dagger, killing four people and injuring eight. This 
is regarded as the worst mass murder incident in 30 years in Japan. 
Kato, who had been working as a temporary worker at an auto 
parts factory, is thought to have no friends, and was weary from 
his employment circumstances, which provided no continuity, 
expansivity, or communality. It is said that interactions on internet 
discussion boards rather deepened his feeling of isolation, and that 
before the attack he posted messages such as: “I am tired of my 
life. I want to be famous and appear on television talk shows.” It 
is reported by the Japanese National Police Agency that, apparent 
copycat criminals, similar cases, and smilar false warnings by young 
people sharply increased after the incident (more than one hundred 
in one month). 
8 “The Japanese Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare defines 
hikikomori as people who refuse to leave their house, and isolate 
themselves from society in their homes for a period exceeding six 
months. While the degree of the phenomenon varies on an individual 
basis, in the most extreme cases, some people remain in isolation for 
years, or even decades. Often hikikomori start out as school refusals, 
or futōkō in Japanese (the older term is tōkōkyohi). The Ministry 
of Health estimates that approx. 50,000 hikikomori live in Japan, 
about one third of which are aged 30 and older (Larimer 2000)” 
(Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hikikomori). However, 
this official figure from the government is considered to be the 
most conservative estimate. Another estimate by NHK Welfare 
Network in 2005 shows there are more than 1.6 million hikikomoris, 
increasing to more than 3 million if quasi-hikikomoris, who go 
outside occasionally, are included.
9 A survey published by Hitotsubashi Bungei Kyoiku Shinkoukai 
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At several points in the history of modern Japanse 
society, for example, the Great Depression in the 1930s, 
and in the years of confusion after Japan’s defeat in World 
War II, young adults suffered from a far more serious 
employment situation than today due to recession. For 
older generations who actually experienced life during 
such periods, the younger generations of today probably 
appear too naive when they – while enjoying a life with 
adequate food, clothing, and housing – complain of 
their dissatisfaction, and desire for social recognition. 
Consider, however, that there is an underlying objective 
social and historical structure functioning in the 
background. In ignorance of this, some might only offer 
the younger generations a kind of spritual whipping and/
or encouragement when it comes to their feelings of 
hopelessness and stagnation, but this does not help them 
cope. By itself, the fact we are in a sluggish economy does 
not provide any persuasive explanation of the mechanism 
of the mental hardships younger generations today are 
experiencing. The essential problem is that people are 
deprived of the opportunity to connect their own power 
to society, while: social capital continues to be more 
accumulated than ever; the total amount of knowledge 
and information available for individuals has significantly 
increased; communication technologies have developed; 
and the potentiality of any individuals to relate themselves 
to a universal human society is exponentialy increasing. 
In Marxian economics, this is the so-called problem of 
relative surplus-population (reserve army of labour); 
this is a quantitative matter in general, but a qualitative 
problem is also occurring here due to the continuing 
development of globalisation. We are transforming into a 
global subject. The transformation is, however, still mid-
process, we are in the middle of labor pains. Theoretical 
approaches to this problem of qualitative transformation 
of subjectivity have just started to take form. 
Enter Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri: in their 
popular book Empire10, they argue from a platform based 
on Marxist vision that a new kind of subject – called 
‘multitude’ – is being formed against the background 
of the post-modern global unification of societies, 
economies, and cultures. According to their theory, thanks 
to the global development of mature capitalism, the 
outside disappeared and “the plane of immanence”11, a 
world filled with powers, has been opened up. Therefore, 
subjects are emerging on earth that are able to own 
Foundation and Nihon Seishonen Kenkyuujo Institute in February 
2011 shows that feelings of self-worth among Japanese high school 
students are outstandingly low compared to students in the U.S., 
China, and Korea; the response rate to the statement: “I am a 
worthwhile person” was 57.2% in the U.S., 42.2% in China, 20.2% 
in Korea, and only 7.5% in Japan. Most Japanese students feel 
“depressed and in low spirits” and “feel myself to be worthless”. 
http://www1.odn.ne.jp/youth-study/ (Japanese only).
10 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire, Harvard University 
Press, 2000.
11 ibid. p. 71.
and use capitalism’s powers of civilization, science, 
technology, knowledge, and information as their own, 
without the mediation of nation. So it is here the human 
subject will appear who can actively configure all the 
domains of the political, the social, the economic, and 
the biotic, as their own life – although Empire will 
naturally seek to deter this effort by limiting the freedom 
of people’s ambulations, administering their labor time, 
and maintaining people as a mere multitude of discrete 
individuals. Hardt/Negri understand that there is no 
“outside” anymore, since capitalism is constituting Empire 
as a truly global economic order, and consequently 
the capabilities of individuals mediated and amplified 
by civilization is flowing back to them as their own 
“constituent power”.
The program that Hardt/Negri’s Empire proposes 
is that the “universal individuals”12, which Marx once 
said are formed through global social intercourse, can 
transform themselves into revolutionary subjects against 
Empire when they become aware of themselves as a 
part of the “multitude”. A distinctive characteristic of 
their theory is that they argue the trajectory of capital 
will realize a qualitative transformation of subjects. 
However, can it really be said that the emancipation of 
such energy or power can be realized only through an 
awareness of being such a multitude subject, the security 
of global civil rights, and basic subsistence income (“a 
citizenship income”13) as Hardt/Negri proposed? How 
can we be guaranteed that what is supposed to be a 
“constituent power” is not actually a constituted power? 
It might be possible to regard the 1999 protests against 
the WTO Ministerial Conference in Seattle, the 2010-
11 Arab Spring, the Occupy Wall Street movement of 
2011 and, if you like, even the 2011 England riots, as 
expressions of multitude revolutions. However in Japan, 
for example, as yet there seems to be no indication of a 
common acknowledgement, let alone resonating actions 
agaisnt situations, even as a sense of stagnation and lack 
of hope is rampant especially among younger generations 
as previously stated, while a siginificantly high suicide 
rate is persistant among middle-aged adults and seniors 
(especially males)14 and individual blowoffs of violence 
12 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology (ca.1845), 
Part I, A, “5. Development of the Productive Forces as a Material 
Premise of Communism”. (http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/
works/1845/ german-ideology/ch01a.htm)
13 Hardt and Negri, Empire, p.403.
14 Since 1998, the annual number of suicides has exceeded 30,000 
in Japan, with the highest peek in the post war period. Japan has one 
of the world’s highest suicide rates (two times greater than the U.S.), 
especially amongst industrialized nations (the highest both among 
G8 and OECD countries), and the Japanese government reported the 
rate for 2006 as being the ninth highest in the world. The announced 
annual number by National Police Agency is yet considered to be 
one of most conservative estimates, and it is said there are more than 
ten times suicide attempts than actual number. The survey revealed 
that most suicides are men (71% in 2007) and there is almost no 
significant fluctuations for the female rate through the decades, while 
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by cornered sprits are occasionally seen. In Japan, where 
is the multitude?
Hardt/Negri’s narrative boldy heralds the appearance 
of a new form of the world, Empire, and, and at the 
same time, the birth of a new mode of subjectivity, 
multitude, while citing a variety of sundry phenomenon 
and classics as evidence. Yet, their oracle-like work fails 
to provide any rigorous theoretical grounding for itself. 
On the whole, it sounds rather like a call for the coming 
of the Messiah, resembling somewhat the prophetic 
expectations of early Marx for a proletarian revolution. 
A sorely needed theoretical framework containing a 
critique of the political economy of the mature Marx 
seems to have been abandoned by Hardt/Negri, even 
while they imply that they were essentially inspired by 
the Outlines of the Critique of Political Economy 1857-
58 (Grundrisse, hereinafter). Furthermore, even Slavoj 
Žižek, who sharply criticises Hardt/Negri calling himself 
a materialist-Leninist, tends to use Christian metaphors 
like “Holy Spirit” and “space of a collective of believers” 
when discussing this currently generating dimension, and 
the subjectivity which belongs to it15. Unfortunately, these 
kinds of theories are incapable of providing an intrinsic 
critical theory about the sense of stagnation and lack 
of hope which holds Japanese society captive. To solve 
the problem of this gap between theory and reality, this 
discussion will reconsider the process of the generation of 
Marx’s “different subject”16 from a “trajectory of capital” 
and the subjective effect of this process on its very 
subject.
2.  A DIFFERENT SUBJECT
The “different subject” is the “social individual”17 
which Marx sketched in Grundrisse. It is the individual 
who is liberated from the “appropriation of living 
labor”18 by capital – the human being released from 
subordination to the “organic composition of capital”19 
the rate of middle aged males apparently corresponds to changes in 
the economic situation. (cf. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suicide_in_
Japan)
15 Slavoj Žižek uses Hegel’s idea of “the concrete universal” as 
a key concept to express a Christian revolutionary subject (The 
Parallax View, MIT Press, 2006, pp. 103-111. “The commedy of 
incarnation” ). Žižek, reverting to Kantianism, replaces this subject 
who places himself in a space of the “concrete universal” with the 
“singular universality”, which is a direct coupling of singularity 
and universality, and relates it to an immediate social productivity 
in Marx’s Grundrisse. Žižek uses the central dogma of Christianity 
to express an image of this “singular universality”. “This space of 
singular universality is what, within Christianity, appears as the ‘Holy 
Spirit’—the space of a collective of believers subtracted from the field 
of organic communities, or of particular life-world (“neither Greeks 
nor Jews” (First As Tragedy, Then As Farce, Verso, 2009, p. 105).
16 Karl Marx, Grundrisse, Penguin Books, 1973, p.712.
17 ibid., p.705.
18 ibid., p.703.
19 Karl Marx, Capital vol.I, Penguin Books, 1976, p.762. 
which constitutes large-scale industry. Then and there, 
Marx predicted, human beings would live lives released 
from the contradictions constituted by the disparity 
between the abundance of material “real wealth”20 
produced by science and knowledge, and the wealth of 
(exchange) value based on the “superfluous labor time”21 
squeezed out of the organic composition of capital. 
As long as social constitutions are totally subsumed in 
the organic composition of capital, however, workers 
become fettered in ever fragmenting, more vacant, and 
still prolonged labor, in the middle of the great material 
wealth produced by capitalist production. The organic 
composition of capital, that is, the composition of variable 
capital (living labor) and constant capital (dead labor), 
requires the “social characteristics [die gesellschaftlichen 
Charaktere]”22 of human labor in order to produce surplus-
value, while mechanized large-scale industry is gradually 
making the direct human labor of workers unnecessary. In 
that meaning, we are potentially becoming able to enjoy 
a truly rich life filled with “disposable time”23. Under the 
constitution of capitalist mode of production, i.e., under 
the capitalist relation of productive forces and production 
relations, however, this extra time does not appear as 
the “disposable time”. It only emerges for capitalists 
as “superfluous labor time” – as the simple opposite of 
“socially necessary labor time” – which capital requires 
to reproduce its own organic composition. Generally 
speaking, it is not even recognized by workers. It is the 
life of capital, and therefore, the life of workers, as long as 
they are subsumed in the organic composition of capital as 
proletariats. If it is removed, the dynamic of capital comes 
to a standstill. This is the very reason why it is so difficult 
for someone located within this organic composition of 
capital to conceive of its abolition.
The process of reproduction of capital as capital 
intrinsically contains contradiction, according to Marx, 
since it continues to require direct human labor as a 
source of surplus-value, whereas it continuously makes 
direct human labor increasingly unnecessary through 
the necessary development of scientific and mechanized 
production systems for continuous production of surplus-
value. The result is that “living labor” becomes “dead 
labor” and vice versa “dead labor” becomes “living 
labor”. More accurately, the social character of human 
labor, that is, the faculty of organizing production which 
is being subsumed in the organic composition of capital, 
is transferred into the machinery system, and becomes per 
se increasingly unnecessary for the production process. 
Workers, whose social character is no longer required in 
the sphere of production, would exercise it, instead, in the 
act of consumption, and come to support the reproduction 
20 Grundrisse, ibid., p.708.
21 ibid., p.706.
22 Marx, Capital vol.I, p.164.
23 Marx, Grundrisse, p.708.
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process of capital. Accompanying the development of 
capitalism, a developed consumer society will appear. 
Withdrawal of the social character of human labor from 
the sphere of production, and its shift to that of the 
consumption is a normal trajectory of social constitutions, 
based on the capitalist mode of production.
In Capital, Marx begins with describing the equality 
of each of the double characters of commodity and labor, 
which implies the interaction of both. The dual character 
of commodity – use value and exchange value, is 
originally derived from the dual character of human labor–
material character (processing natural materials) and 
social character (cooperation). However, conversely, in a 
developed capitalist society where commodity has already 
become a medium totally permeating the society, the 
subjects become the providers of labor force commodity, 
which is to be subsumed into the organic composition of 
capital, under the influence of the fetish character of the 
commodity’s dualism. This is because, as Marx said, social 
relations are reified in commodities24. In the eyes of a 
subject who is born and raised in a capitalist society, these 
social relations, which are incarnated into commodities, 
appear to glow with an aura. No subjects can flee from 
this magical power. Various knowledge, technologies, 
and forms of cooperation, which were used to produce 
it, and could be regarded as an immense amount of labor 
time, i.e., value, are invested into a commodity. A subject, 
who has grown up in a society where social relations are 
constituted by the medium of the (exchange) value, has 
naturally developed eyes that recognize the value in a 
commodity. This is a social adjustment. Most subjects 
gravitate to the aura of commodities, and unavoidably 
end up deciding to make themselves wage laborers, and 
sell their own time as wage labor. Some other subjects 
decide to rejoin this reproduction process of aura 
through commodity production, taking up the position of 
capitalists. To avoid this “salto mortale”25 (mortal jump) 
is virtually impossible for a subject since it would mean 
to become a social misfit.
What kind of human being is capable of breaking this 
chain of circulation? When, and how, would emancipation 
come? In concrete terms this question – regarding the 
24 Capital, vol.I, Chapter 1, Section 4: “The Fetishism of the 
Commodity and Its Secret”. 
25 Capital, vol.1, p. 200. Kojin Karatani, a well-known Japanese 
literary critic, understands this “salto mortale” as a point of junction 
of the production process and the circulation process. Based on 
this understanding, explicitely going back to Proudhonism, he 
shaped and implemented a movement by workers as consumers 
that overcomes the dominance of nation by means of a type of 
LETS (Local Exchange Trading System). This movement was 
named NAM (New Associationalist Movement) and commenced 
in 2000, aiming for a revolution in/from circulation sphere through 
an implementation of the local currency “Q”, but broke up in 
2003 mainly because of its unsuccessful human relationships and 
management (to be continued in Appendix 1 at the end of the paper.). 
Cf. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kojin_Karatani.
when and the how remains after all unanswered in both 
early and late Marx26. He simply alluded to a faint vision 
of a possible mode of a “different subject”. In my middle-
term project, nevertheless, I would like to think about 
what kind of human this could be, and how, and to what 
extent, we are actually approaching this phenomenon in 
our current situation by examining Marx’s analysis of the 
trajectory of capital. In order to do that, this paper will 
reexamine the implications of the “social character” of 
labor, tracing up until Marx, passing through Marx, and 
extending down beyond Marx. This “social character” 
of labor is, from the viewpoint of today’s thought, a 
dimension of the social imagination of human beings, 
and its origin could be said to be in the imaginary power 
of the mirror stage in terms of psychoanalysis. It is a 
subsumption of this “social character” into production that 
is the source of the contradictory dynamic of capital, and 
therefore the dynamic of history. Although capital, out of 
its own tendencies, is gradually withdrawing from direct 
appropriation of the social character of labor since the 
establishment of large-scale industry, it continues to need 
to detain direct human labor in order to produce surplus-
value. Since the process of subsumption of labor’s social 
character into production is the process of modernization, 
when this process approaches its limit, the process of 
modernization (and with it, the process of history), will 
end. In this sense, to think about what the “different 
subject” is, is to think about what the human being after 
the end of history will be. 
3.  HISTORY AND NEGATIVITY
I shall return to Hegel momentarily to reconsider the 
relationship of Marx’s “social character” of labor and 
history. It would be an important step to discover a 
relationship between the characteristics of negativity and 
the dynamic of history in Hegel in order to see a post-
historic and post-capitalistic mode of Marx’s “social 
character”. As we shall see below, negativity in Hegel is 
the primordial that generates time and, and simultaneously, 
the origin of its negativity is a dimension of preconscious 
assimilation where human subjective consciousness is 
developed. As Alexandre Kojève discussed, the key to 
an elucidation of the nature of a connection between the 
characteristics of negativity, human labor and history lies 
in Hegel’s philosophy, that is, in its relationship between 
the movement of Spirit (Geist) (which contains negativity 
in it) and history27. 
26 Naturally he talked about “revolution” – more often earlier, and 
later, less. Yet we have absolutely no idea what kind of revolution it 
should be now, in the twenty-first century, after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the capitalization of China. This, precisely, is the 
issue.
27 Alexandre Kojève, Introduction à la lecture de Hegel : Leçons sur 
la Phénoménologie de l’Esprit, professées de 1933 à 1939 à l’École 
des Hautes-Études, réunies et publiées par Raymond Queneau, 
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Speaking of the relationship between the movement 
of Spirit and history, Heidegger once criticized Hegel’s 
concept of time and history in terms of its relation to 
Spirit at the very end of his discontinued project: Being 
and Time, as follows: 
Hegel’s ‘construction’ was prompted by his arduous struggle 
to conceive the ‘concretion’ of the spirit. He makes this known 
in the following sentence from the concluding chapter of his 
Phenomenology of Spirit: ‘Thus time appears as the very fate 
and necessity which spirit has when it is not in itself complete: 
the necessity of its giving self-consciousness a richer share in 
consciousness, of its setting in motion the immediacy of the “in-
itself” (the form in which substance is in consciousness), or, 
conversely, of its realizing and making manifest the “in-itself” 
taken as the inward (and this is what first is inward)--that is, of 
vindicating it for its certainty of itself.’
Our existential analytic of Dasein, on the contrary, starts 
with the ‘concretion’ of factically thrown existence itself in 
order to unveil temporality as that which primordially makes 
such existence possible. ‘Spirit’ does not first fall into time, 
but it exists as the primordial temporalizing of temporality. 
Temporality temporalizes world-time, within the horizon of 
which ‘history’ can ‘appear’ as historizing within-time. ‘Spirit’ 
does not fall into time; but factical existence ‘falls’ as falling 
from primordial, authentic temporality. This ‘falling’ [“Fallen”], 
however, has itself its existential possibility in a mode of its 
temporalizing--a mode which belongs to temporality.28
What Heidegger is saying here is something like 
this: Hegel gives primacy to the abstract and necessary 
development of Spirit in the course of Phenomenology, 
and only after the full development of it is Spirit finally 
put into a concrete dimension of time at the very end of 
the book. The unfolding of logical forms of Spirit should 
be put first, and then, Hegel tries to throw the movement 
of Spirit into temporality in order to fill out the vacancy 
of the form of Spirit, and give it a concrete thickness 
and richness. This, from Heidegger’s point of view, 
is totally inverted. Since Hegel’s time is a negation of 
negation, that is, an abstract time, Spirit could not obtain 
a concrete phase, even if he put Spirit into it. According 
to Heidegger, human spirit is, from the beginning, in a 
rich and original temporality, and that temporality is itself 
a deep and abundant primordial from which subjectivity 
rather could drop off. That is the entire problem of human 
spirit.
This reading of Hegel by Heidegger is surprisingly 
incorrect. Hegel never said that Spirit falls into time. 
Hegel is, instead, saying at that point of Phenomenology 
that time is generated from the movement of Spirit, 
which means he is talking about the spirituality of time. 
Gallimard, 1968, p. 575. (This part is not included in the English 
abbreviated translation by James H. Nichols, Jr [1969], Introduction 
to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit, 
Cornell University Press, 1980). As I shall later state (in the section 
4), Kojève ties too strongly Hegel’s conception of negativity to the 
concept of death.
28 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, translated by John Macquarrie 
and Edward Robinson, 1962, p. 486.
If we put aside the kind of prejudice that accuses Hegel 
of disguising theological themes with his philosophical 
terms, and understand Hegel’s thought as that which 
is trying to conceive the historical dynamic of modern 
society, and if we understand his Spirit as a representation 
of the movement of modern society (even though his trial 
is inferior to the historicism of Marx’s critique of political 
economy), then it becomes possible to conclude that 
Hegel argued that time is produced from the very dynamic 
of modern society. 
Attempts are often made to understand the unfolding 
of narratives in Phenomenology of Spirit in accordance 
with the development of logical forms in Science of 
Logic or The Encyclopaedia Logic, or, to understand it 
as a tracing down of the developmental history of human 
mind. Those attempts fail to understand the very nature 
of the book of Phenomenology. Hegel thinks that logic 
and history emerge from the movement of Spirit. Hegel is 
composing Phenomenology based on the idea that when 
human consciousness relates (reflects) self-recursively its 
own multilayered or multidimensional composition, the 
movement of the Spirit as a supra-individual constitution 
is generated there. This occurs before the genesis of 
the system of sciences, which itself results from the 
movement of this Spirit. Logic, nature and history appear 
at the end of the discourse of Phenomenology29. Thus time 
and history are created as the result of the movement of 
Spirit, or as a trajectory of it. So it is not that there is a 
kind of primordial temporality, and then spirit falls into 
or out of it. The contents of Spirit that Hegel is describing 
are, after all, nothing but a trajectory of the development 
of forms that modern consciousness holds. Being self-
conscious of its own trajectory means, according to 
Hegel, to be absolute knowledge. We could conclude 
from all of the above that history in Hegel’s philosophy is 
a product of the movement of the modernized self. That 
is, Hegel was talking about the historicity of history or 
time. Heidegger took a wrong turn, since he postulates a 
primordial temporality and assumes it still is a temporality. 
The primordium of time should not be time. It should be 
something different from time. Hegel called it negativity. 
Yes Hegel does make a significant omission, compared 
to Marx, in that he never articulated what it is that drives 
the movement of Spirit, i.e., of the unfolding of narratives 
of Phenomenology. Readers are often left wondering what 
is realizing the transitions between chapters, or simply 
just cannot understand the necessity of the transition. 
Why does Consciousness become Self-consciousness? 
And how does Self-consciousness become Reason? Hegel 
tried to place logical explanations at each point of the 
transition, but these often seem insufficient, without being 
supplemented by reader’s speculation or imagination.
29 G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, translated by J.B. 
Baillie, Dover Publications, Inc., 2003, pp. 474-476. [Suhrkamp, 
Werke, Bd.3, S. 588-591]
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Since the twentieth century, including a major work by 
Adorno, many thinkers pointed out that the negativity is 
functioning as a driving force in the unfolding movement 
of Hegel’s Spirit. It can be said, in the meantime, that 
there are two kinds of negativity in Phenomenology. 
Firstly, there is the negativity of the object facing to 
consciousness. The outside object apparently shows its 
external negativity against consciousness (negativity I). 
But this negativity of objects is not capable of enduring 
the negativity of consciousness (negativity II). It is this 
negativity II, the negativity of consciousness, which 
plays an apparent leading role in the movement of 
Hegel’s Spirit. This is a faculty of consciousness, in that 
consciousness: takes in objects into itself, negates the 
otherness of these objects (negativity I), and internalizes 
them. No external objects can resist this negativity of 
consciousness (negativity II). That is the fundamental 
thesis in Phenomenology. Consciousness internalizes 
every extrinsic object, and makes it its own property. At 
the same time, the negativity of consciousness works 
on consciousness itself. Consciousness digs into the 
multilayered composition which it already holds in itself 
as a social consciousness, comprehends it explicitly, 
and acquires it as its own properties bit by bit. This self-
reflective negativity is essential for consciousness to 
become a self-consciousness, a truly human consciousness 
– transcending being just a natural consciousness. Hegel 
thinks that the interaction with the negativity of the 
other consciousness is required for consciousness, so 
that negativity II of a consciousness is bent and pointed 
back on itself. Hegel explains it as in “The above general 
independent nature [consciousness], however, in the case 
of which negation takes the form of absolute negation, 
is the species as such, or as self-consciousness. Self-
consciousness attains its satisfaction only in another self-
consciousness”30. Hegel is shaping a mechanism there 
in which subjects who acquire an external view point 
from which to see themselves is generated; negativity 
II, which tries to take in others, clashes with each other, 
permeates each other, and then results in becoming self-
consciousness. 
Negativity is just a term that appears only occasionally, 
and actually never became one of the outstanding main 
themes in Hegel’s work. Hegel didn’t leave behind any 
detailed or organized descriptions about the functions 
and classifications of these negativities. The explanation 
and classification above is of my own authorship, and is 
just an extracted product from the way of unfolding of 
Phenomenology pursuing the principle of its development. 
Therefore,  the relat ion between negat ivi ty  I 
and negativity II is not necessarily clear, and the 
differentiation between them is just a provisional one. 
When we provisionally grasp the negativities at work 
30 ibid., p. 103. (translation amended.) [Suhrkamp, Werke, Bd.3, S. 144]
in Phenomenology as classified above, the following 
two problems are revealed, which are the fundamental 
problems of Hegel’s philosophy. Firstly, if the negativity 
of consciousness (negativity II) is capable of internalizing 
any objects and making them itself after all, why is 
consciousness not Spirit or Absolute Knowledge from 
the beginning? This problem implies the possibility of 
the backwardness of consciousness. Secondly, what 
is the momentum for consciousness to become self-
consciousness, i.e., an occasion by which negativity II 
is turned toward consciousness itself? It seems there 
is a kind of negativity that can bend the negativity of 
consciousness. It seems another kind of negativity 
(negativity III), which is functionally different from the 
negativity II, is working there31. 
Now we are left with three kinds of negativities32. 
Though it is unnecessary to further allow these kinds 
of negativities to proliferate, Phenomenology at least 
should be read in a way in which there is some kind of 
negative ground from which consciousness emerges, 
but which consciousness cannot easily render into itself, 
and through the unavoidable struggle with this negative 
ground, consciousness will generate and develop as Spirit. 
This philosophical wrestling of Hegel with that kind of 
negativity fascinated Marx, and led him to the insight that 
a space called society which is neither the consciousness 
nor the objects, yet includes a unique dynamic – was 
born in the modern era in a form of capitalism. Thought 
by which to elucidate what the ground is has been 
required since then. All of the later significant criticisms 
of Hegel’s Phenomenology are after all, accusations 
31 It is also a paramount question of philosophy whether this 
negativity III could (or could not) be identified with the negativity 
I that external objects hold. Some may think, regarding principle 
of unfolding history, that consciousness is transformed as it meets 
the negativity of matter, and this is Marxian historical materialism. 
I disagree, though. I rather consider that negativity III is first 
generated, and then negativity I and II are consequently generated 
as an oppositional set of modern subject and object. This scheme 
could be elaborated based on Marx’s insights in Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. Judith Butler and Slavoj 
Žižek understand Hegel’s negativity is ultimately a negativity 
of corporeality or the real. However, if one lacks a theoretical 
grounding in the dimension of human desire, one loses an essential 
foothold for a historical theory of the dynamic composition of 
capitalism, since it is not the negativity of the material thing that 
is working at the core of the composition of capital. This is one 
of the reasons why Žižek, whose theory is not following the line 
of Kojèvean theory – the dimension of human desire, but rather 
Lacanian – the return of the oppressed, cannot adequately picture a 
relationship between the trajectory of capital and the transformation 
of subjectivity. Cf. Judith Butler, Subjects of Desire, Columbia 
University Press, 1987 and Slavoj Žižek, First As Tragedy, Then As 
Farce, Verso, 2009. See also Appendix 2.
32 Deter Henrich also discusses that negativity appears three times in 
Hegel’s philosophy, although his way of articulating this is different 
from that used this papaer. Dieter Henrich, “Hegels Grundoperation, 
eine Einleitung in die ,Wissenschaft der Logik‘” in Der Idealismus 
und seine Gegenwart (hrsg. von Ute Guzzoni u.a., Felix Meiner, 
1976), S. 217-18.
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against the seeming incapability or inefficiency of his 
way of handling this ground. Schelling wrote Of Human 
Freedom two years after Hegel’s Phenomenology as an 
implicit criticism towards it, in which he started his later 
inclination toward a “positive philosophy” which aims 
for a direct grasp of “Grund (ground)” from which human 
consciousness emerges and on which Hegel never directly 
commented33. Marx criticized Hegel in Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, arguing that Hegel 
ended up in an inversion/absurdity (Verkehrtheit) that 
self-comprehension of Spirit becomes the negation of the 
negation, and the “species-being”34 which is actually a 
rich and concrete universal is converted into vacant logical 
forms precisely because Hegel starts with the negativity 
of consciousness. (As I discuss further later, mature Marx 
showed that Hegel’s idealistic inversion is actually an 
expression of a social form of capitalist society.) 
Hegel having posited man as equivalent to self-consciousness, 
the estranged object – the estranged essential reality of man–
is nothing but consciousness, the thought of estrangement 
merely – estrangement’s abstract and therefore empty and unreal 
expression, negation. The supersession of the alienation is 
therefore likewise nothing but an abstract, empty supersession 
of that empty abstraction – the negation of the negation. The 
rich, living, sensuous, concrete activity of self-objectification is 
therefore reduced to its mere abstraction, absolute negativity–
an abstraction which is again fixed as such and considered as 
an independent activity – as sheer activity. Because this so-
called negativity is nothing but the abstract, empty form of 
that real living act, its content can in consequence be merely a 
formal content produced by abstraction from all content. As a 
result therefore one gets general, abstract forms of abstraction 
pertaining to every content and on that account indifferent to, 
and, consequently, valid for, all content – the thought-forms or 
logical categories torn from real mind and from real nature.35
Heidegger argued, as previously mentioned, that 
Hegel’s Spirit needs to fall into temporality to avoid its 
abstract and empty negativity36. Adorno advocated a 
“negative dialectics” to escape from Hegel’s oppressive 
identical positivity as the negation of the negation, and 
stay in the abundance of the negativity. Each of these 
criticisms has a point. All of these may be attributed to 
the fact that Hegel did not uncover what the source of 
negativity III is which causes the unfolding of Spirit. 
Negativity III, which could negate the negativity of 
consciousness, should be something different from simple 
matter, since any simple material object cannot resist the 
33 F.W.J. Schelling, Philosophical Inquiries into the Nature of 
Human Freedom (1809), trans. James Gutmann, Open Court 
Publishing Company, 2003. 
34 Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (1844), 
Third Manuscript, Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy 
as a Whole, XXVII (http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/
works/1844/manuscripts/hegel.htm) translated by Martin Mulligan 
in 1959.
35 ibid., XXXI. ‘Self-consciousness’ in Marx seems to corresponding 
with ‘consciousness’ in Hegel. 
36 Heidegger, ibid.
negativity of consciousness37. Negativity III should be, 
of course, another kind of negativity than the negativity 
II of consciousness, but at the same time it should be 
ultimately internalized (appropriated) by the negativity 
II of consciousness. The exact relationship between 
negativity II and III remains a matter of examination, 
though it cannot be accomplished here. Instead, I leave 
two brief remarks. Firstly, Hegel’s notions (such as his 
“determinate negation” and “concrete universality”) imply 
that negativity III could precede negativity II. Secondly, 
it could be helpful to picture negativity II as an abstract 
negativity and negativity III as a concrete negativity.
Hegel just  held back from a further detai led 
investigation of negativity III hiding behind the 
motion of Spirit, and that is the very methodology of 
Phenomenology. He supposedly judged that such an 
investigation was beyond him and the age in which he 
was living. In fact, the philosophy of Schelling, which 
tried to accomplish that very investigation in the same 
age, unavoidably became almost mythical in its tone. 
It was an immensely difficult challenge for philosophy 
for which nobody could find a solution until Marx, and 
in his case, from a totally different point of view i.e., he 
approached it from the standpoint of a critique of political 
economy based on historical materialism. In a nutshell, 
the task is to grasp the multilayered constitution of human 
consciousness and elucidate the origin of the emergence 
of consciousness. The structure of Phenomenology is 
carefully composed specifically to avoid answering this 
difficult problem. Hegel begins with the already-generated 
consciousness, employing a methodology with which he is 
going to extract a variety of forms of consciousness from 
a diversity of experiences of consciousness. A further 
investigation as to how and why human consciousness 
has such a multidimensional structure is completely put 
aside there. If the phenomena of consciousness could be 
organized, and thereby systemize a whole of experience 
and knowledge about the world, then philosophy would 
have accomplished a suitable task in that age – the 
construction of a grounded system of sciences, Hegel 
thought.
His methodology was a great success in that age, but 
at the same time, it nevertheless contained a considerable 
flaw. In order to mend this flaw, Hegel had to make 
a rather tricky assertion about history. As previously 
explained, Hegel, in Phenomenology, argues that history 
will emerge from the movement of Spirit. That could be 
interpreted to mean that Hegel is implicitly indicating the 
historicity of history, that is, if you grasp Hegel’s Spirit 
as the historical movement of modern human society. On 
the other hand, he also declared that history is the true 
37 Remember that even Marx did not advocate a kind of simple 
materialism in this way. Yet there could be another opinion on this 
point, as I previously stated in footnote 31, a postion which argues 
that the power of the material is a motor of history.
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“Theodicaea” (theodicy), in the very last sentences of his 
Lectures on the Philosophy of History. 
That the History of the World, with all the changing scenes 
which its annals present, is this process of development and the 
realization of Spirit – this is the true Theodicaea, the justification 
of God in History. Only this insight can reconcile Spirit with 
the History of the World – viz., that what has happened, and 
is happening every day, is not only not “without God,” but is 
essentially His Work. 38
With saying that about history, Hegel’s history as the 
movement of Spirit could become associated with divine 
nature. This seems to prevent our intention to understand 
Hegel’s history in a historicist way. Yet if we patiently 
follow the development of his entire line of discussion in 
the lectures, Hegel said it – history is the true theodicy – 
in order to mean that we need a kind of negativity in order 
to recognize the movement of history, and, here is the 
crucial point, only Christianity, especially Protestantism, 
can truly capture or cultivate that kind of negativity within 
the human subject. 
As to negativity and history/time, Hegel had already 
discussed the topics in Phenomenology along the 
following lines: Spirit should get out of itself to truly 
know itself, but since Spirit is the whole world itself, 
there is no outside of it. If there is anything extrinsic, it 
should not be the outside as space, but one as time. Hegel 
says if there is a self which is externalized into the outside 
when Spirit externalizes (entäußern) itself as nature, there 
should be something to opposite to it which should be 
called a “pure self (reines Selbst)”39. It could be regarded 
as a necessary gap or disparity (negativity) for Spirit to 
carve out itself outside of itself, a self who is looking at 
a carved-out self, and also a self who is going to take the 
carved-out self back. This pure self is “time (Zeit)”40. 
History is said to be “externalized and emptied into 
Time”.
The other aspect, however, in which Spirit comes into being, 
History, is the process of becoming in terms of knowledge, 
a conscious self-mediating process – Spirit externalized and 
emptied into Time. But this form of abandonment is, similarly, the 
emptying of itself by itself; the negative is negative of itself. 41
(Die andere Seite aber seines Werdens, die Geschichte, ist das 
wissende sich vermittelnde Werden – der an die Zeit entäußerte 
Geist; aber diese Entäußerung ist ebenso die Entäußerung ihrer 
selbst; das Negative ist das Negative seiner selbst.)
This externalization is called the externalization of 
the externalization itself, and Hegel said the negative 
38 Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History, translated by J. 
Sibree (http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/ hegel/works/hi/
lectures4.htm#s39). [Suhrkamp, Werke, Bd.12, S. 540]
39 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, p.475. [Suhrkamp, Werke, Bd.3, 
S.590]
40 ibid.
41 ibid. This English translation by Baillie should be amended. The 
newest translation by Terry Pinkard is almost the same. See also the 
original German text I give below. [Suhrkamp, Werke, Bd.3, S.590.]
is the negative against the negative itself. This excreted 
negativity is not a kind of negativity coming from outside 
of human mind but the negativity from the human mind 
itself, since there is no outside of Sprit. Consciousness 
becomes able to look at itself from the outside, that is, it 
becomes able to internalize the movement of itself, due to 
this negativity. Therefore Hegel also called this the “pure 
self (reines Selbst)”. It is a principle of self-transcending 
and also of self-internalization. You can internalize the 
whole movement of yourself, which is the world per se, 
only from an outside point of view in this meaning. In 
this way, Hegel explained in Phenomenology that time 
is generated from the negativity built in somewhere in 
human mind.
The reason why history is called a true theodicy in 
Philosophy of History is that Hegel supposes that the 
negativity would be internalized in subjects only by the 
Reformation in modern Europe – specifically, only by 
Protestantism in German nations. Hegel called this “the 
principle of interiority (das Prinzip der Innerlichkeit)”42. 
Thus Hegel found within history the origin of the 
negativity which enables the comprehension of history 
– the birth of Protestantism as a historical incident. 
This seems a kind of circular theory. But, for Hegel, it 
is the philosophical thrust to provide for the dynamic 
of history a meaning by connecting the significance of 
both appearance of the modern nation and Christianity 
(Protestantism), finding a reconciliation between religious 
and secular consciences there, and seeing there the 
summit of history that is as a process of realization of 
freedom and faith. Otherwise, Hegel would say, history as 
a human’s narrative of itself would be able to undermine 
itself by the negativity of consciousness per se, and end 
up in a Buddhist-like-nihilism. Hegel’s discussion that 
the process of history reaches its summit through the 
negativity generated by Protestantism is intended to 
neutralize the strong autotoxic side-effect of negativity of 
human mind. In this way, Hegel discovered the source of 
the historical dynamic of modern society at the negativity 
found in the depths of human mind, but didn’t make 
any further investigations into what it actually might be. 
He just posited the movement generated by it as Spirit 
or History. The only historical and social clues he was 
capable of using to affirm and depict the existence of that 
dynamism was the German state and Protestantism, in 
contrast to Marx.
Let me refute Heidegger’s claim again, and summarize 
this section. Hegel’s theoretical constructions in 
Phenomenology imply that the movement of Spirit is 
unfolded by negativity III functioning at the bottom of 
human mind. It can be said that the consciousness that 
emerges from this negativity III becomes negativity 
42 Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History, (Translation 
ameded. J. Sibree translated this “the principle of Subjectivity”.) 
[Suhrkamp, Werke, Bd.12, S.520.]
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II (abstracting negativity), and when consciousness 
objectified its own movements with its abstract negativity 
II in a self-mediating way, history emerges. In this sense, 
time is born from something different from time, and 
this is the only thinking by which a historical theory of 
temporality becomes possible, which is impossible in the 
early Heidegger’s scheme (actually, it remains impossible 
in late Heidegger as well, but due to other reasons), 
since he assumes the primordial temporality is still a 
temporality. Primordial time is not time. It is something 
coming from human mind and something concrete 
compared to the abstract negativity of consciousness 
generated from it. I would say it is the concrete negativity 
or the concrete universality. Time is always and already 
the abstracted. Therefore, the word “abstract time”43 is 
already a redundant term, but it is true that only after we 
become able to imagine a social form other than a current 
capitalist form, we could say there is something like a 
concrete time which becomes an abstract time through 
some sort of form of mediation, but actually, it was even 
not time before the abstraction. Thus we can explain 
how Heidegger’s philosophy lost a chance to be a truly 
critical theory against modern society by failing to think 
of the historicity of temporality in a really radical way, 
to the extent that Hegel does. The biggest shortcoming 
of Hegel’s constitution compared to Marx is, on the 
other hand, that he didn’t pay attention to the historical 
and social forms of the mediation that enable that self-
mediation. Why is Consciousness not Self-consciousness 
from the beginning? Why is there a process of generation? 
Hegel does not answer these questions. Marx’s critique of 
Hegel, if I may speak for him, is the following: negativity 
(or universality) is first formed and developed as a 
concrete negativity or concrete universality. It is developed 
by a social and historical form, but, at the same time, 
its social and historical form gradually transforms this 
concrete negativity into an abstract negativity, by means 
of its own characteristics. This process of transformation 
is history. From the Hegelian side, it can be said that there 
is a self-abstracting negativity. The plurality of negativity 
in Hegelian philosophy should be understood in this way. 
From the Marxian side, on the other hand, it can be said 
that a self-abstraction of negativity is possible due to a 
historically specific form. This social and historical form 
is the organic composition of capital – an unprecedented 
concept of Marx.
43 I borrowed these words from a work by Moishe Postone 
(University of Chicago), Time, Labor, and Social Domination. 
Postone defines the universal unit or medium for the exchange value 
in the capitalist production generated from the mediation of “socially 
necessary time” as the “abstract time”. My paper owes a good 
deal to Postone’s theory about the insight into the relation between 
trajectory of the organic compostion of capital and time. Cf. Moishe 
Postone, Time, Labor and Social Domination: A reinterpretation of 
Marx’s critical theory, Cambridge University Press, 1994.
4 .   T R A J E C TO RY O F  “ O R G A N I C 
COMPOSITION OF CAPITAL” IN MARX
A working assumption of this paper is that negativity 
III, which is the source of the dynamic of Spirit and/or 
History in Hegel, represents the same thing as the “social 
character” of labor in Marx44. In the preceding section, 
it was maintained that Hegel did not pursue an inquiry 
into the nature of this negativity III. Actually, neither did 
Marx. However, Marx theoretically grounded a trajectory 
of self-movement driven by this negativity by means of 
a social and historical form. This form is the “organic 
composition of capital”. A basic formula by which to 
understand the variety of individual historical modes 
of subject in the historic trajectory of capital should 
be: the subsumption of the “social character” of labor 
by the “organic composition of capital” and its release. 
For additional insight, we shall reconsider what Marx’s 
organic composition of capital is – and especially what 
“variable capital” in that composition is – by introducing 
a point of view from our review of Hegel’s negativity 
above. This will grant us deeper understanding of the 
transformation of subject in the trajectory of capital. 
“Variable capital” is that which is historically formed and 
historically dissolved, and its process of formation and 
dissolution is actually nothing other than history itself.
According to Capital, human labor as a commodity 
has a use value and an exchange value corresponding to 
the fact that a commodity has both. Yet, originally, it is 
because of the nature of human labor that a commodity 
has both use value and exchange value. As human labor 
comes to perform its nature as an abstract medium, the 
commodity begins to show its abstract nature as universal 
medium, and its nature appears as the nature of currency 
– the universal medium under a commodity economy. 
Marx begins his discourse of Capital with a description 
of “commodity” in order to further his analysis of 
the peculiar function of human labor under capitalist 
production. In order to accomplish this, he initially posits 
the status that human labor as a medium for exchange 
already has permeated the whole economy, which is 
thereby totally commodified, as a completed status of the 
capitalist mode of production. He then embarks on an 
examination of the specific properties of this phenomenon.
Human labor as a commodity enables, by its nature, 
capital to produce surplus value. It is a primary property 
of human labor whereby its use value produces new 
(exchange) value. The use value of human labor has 
two dimensions: the physical, and the non-physical. 
The physical dimension is the aspect in which human 
44 In this paper, a detailed demonstration that negativity III (which 
is the impetus of history at the bottom of the movement of Spirit) 
can be identified with the intersubjective and social imagination of 
humans must be forgone for the sake of space. It has not been left 
undone. See Appendix 2.
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beings process raw materials, handle tools, and/or control 
production equipment. The non-physical dimension is 
the ability as “living labor” to activate “dead labor”. 
This non-physical dimension of the use value of human 
labor makes the organic composition of capital function. 
This is the capacity to vitalize the stock of knowledge 
and technology already accumulated as the result of past 
human labor, and make it run as a system. This aspect of 
the use value of human labor – living labor – is changing 
its way of functioning as, according to Marx, the capitalist 
mode of production increases its level of completion 
from “co-operation” through “division of labor and 
manufacture” to “machinery and large-scale industry”45. 
Through co-operation, the most advantageous effect of 
human labor is, above all, the organization of production 
by its “social character”. Human labor here performs 
its nature as “species-power [Gattungskräfte]”46 by 
dramatically and efficiently enhancing production through 
cooperation. In the division of labor and manufacturing, 
individual labor specialized for particular skills functions 
as an organ of organized labor as a whole, in order to 
increase productivity even further. In large-scale industry, 
the “social character” of human labor is transferred into the 
machinery, which begins to operate itself as an autonomous 
system, and human labor comes to be subordinated to the 
machine system as a mere “living labor”.
Since the arrival of the era of large-scale industry, and 
the legal systems through which wage labor is developed, 
it becomes increasingly difficult for capital to produce 
absolute surplus value by means of a simple extension 
of the working day. Capitalists are forced to ratchet up 
the rate of surplus value by producing relative surplus 
value through more investments back into the constant 
capital. Then, a particular characteristic of the organic 
composition of capital, the composition of “variable 
capital” (labor power) and “constant capital” (raw 
materials and product equipment), becomes conspicuous. 
Capital is forced to work harder to increase capital value 
by reinvesting surplus value into constant capital in order 
to increase the rate of surplus value indirectly. Thus, 
eventually, the rate of surplus value can be increased only 
by a relative decrease in the value of labor (the cost of 
means of subsistence).
Why can capital produce surplus value by its organic 
composition in the first place? The “living labor” provided 
by wage laborers enable capitalists to handle “dead 
labor” – the products already produced in the past – as 
“commodities”. Capitalist means a kind of subject who’s 
eyes see all various kinds of goods as “commodities” – 
as products which include exchange value. The potential 
value that “dead labor” or the product has is vitalized or 
45 Capital vol.I, p. 439-639 (Chapter 13-15).
46 Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (1844), 
Third Manuscript, XXIII: “Critique of Hegel’s Dialectic and 
General Philosophy”.
revitalized, and is given additional value only through the 
production process – i.e., contact with “living labor”. The 
“commodity” which comes out of the production process 
appears to consumers as a product with fetish power – as 
product possessing “value”.
Why can the production process activate the value 
of a product, and add more value to it? This is because, 
in a commodified world, the following psychological 
mechanism is at  work (even subconsciously,  or 
unconsciously). Originally, the (exchange) value is the 
energy and effort required to produce a product. However, 
since it is not easy to evaluate the energy and effort 
uniformly, time consumed for production becomes a 
scale of value. A greatly cared for and elaborated product 
reminds a person who picks it up of the amount of time 
consumed in producing it, and his/her imagination allows 
products to exert a fetish allurement over them. It is thus 
a form of human imagination, the faculty to project one’s 
subjectivity to other’s subjectivity, which makes this 
condition possible. The dimension of inter-subjective 
imagination required to put oneself into someone’s 
position permits the fetish character of things. Thus, it is 
the essential characteristic of capitalist mode of production 
that the circulation process is always and already reflected 
on the production process47.
The completion of this condition, in that one can 
evaluate the value of a product not by the value of another 
product but by “abstract time”48 or currency as a universal 
medium, is achieved only after the ubiquitous presence 
of a specific form of human existence – wage laborers. 
Then, the value that a product has, i.e., the energy and 
effort consumed in its production, becomes the value as 
abstract time. So then, what exactly is a wage laborer? 
The wage laborer is a person who doesn’t have anything 
but his/her labor to contribute towards production. 
While the existence of the wage laborer itself will be 
“completed” along with the historical development of the 
capitalist mode of production, and whatever the concrete 
historical process of its establishment is, once the social 
existence of the wage laborer is universally established, 
the measurement of human labor by abstract time 
becomes settled.
Labor provided by the wage laborer is pure “living 
labor”. It gives life to the organic composition of capital. 
Yet, on the other hand, it is just an existence that gives life 
to the organic composition of capital, and it in itself cannot 
survive as an independent organism (which is quite ironic 
considering it is called “living”). Pure “living labor” is 
nothing other than “social character” which is a property 
of human labor in its purified form. It is originally a 
faculty for seeing the other’s labor in the “dead labor” 
– other’s products, and to enable individuals to exercise 
47 See also Appendix 1.
48 Mosihe Postone, Time, Labor, and Social Domination. See also 
footnote 55.
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cooperation and division of labor by a mutual exchange 
of viewpoints with others. The completed wage laborer, 
however, cannot recognize this ability in him/herself as a 
“social character” since he/she has already become pure 
“living labor”. The wage laborer thus ends up no more 
than a being that provides life to constant capital, being 
wholly subsumed in the organic composition of capital.
The power that “living labor” originally possessed, in 
other words, the “social character” of human labor, is not 
a kind of quality that can be calculated quantitatively with 
“abstract time”49. The reason why capital can produce 
surplus value is that capital is exploiting the wage laborer 
by rendering this dimension of the “use value” of human 
labor to the exchange value by means of calculating 
it with the “value of labor” (value of the cost of 
subsistence). Certainly, individuals can survive as a living 
substance receiving the cost of means of subsistence, 
however, he/she is actually also providing for capitalists 
his/her own “living labor” to the organic composition of 
capital in exchange for the cost of subsistence in the form 
of a wage. It is possible to calculate the “value of labor” 
precisely because it is measured by the value of living 
necessities – the time consumed to produce them. This 
is supposed to be the (exchange) value of the labor – the 
value of a wage worker per se. This labor that capitalists 
seized in exchange of its exchange value, however, will 
increase productivity, and thereby decrease the exchange 
value of labor (the necessary time to maintain and 
reproduce labor). In other words, the use value of labor 
decreases the exchange value of labor, in the capitalist 
mode of production. Put simply, the productivity of 
the social character of human labor is actually going 
to reduce the necessary labor time to survive. In the 
capitalist mode of production, however, the potential 
surplus time which is supposed to appear is in reality 
added into the value of commodity as surplus value and 
thrown into the circulation process, and then, it flows 
back to capitalists in the form of money capital. Due to 
this mechanism of the relative surplus value production, 
money capital recaptured by capitalists will be reinvested 
into the constant capital. Thus what is potentially social 
surplus-time is accumulated socially in the form of the 
augmentation of constant capital. Marx phrases this in 
Grundrisse that time as “wealth”, which by right should 
be given back to laborers as the “disposable time”, is 
being transformed into surplus value and accumulated as 
constant capital (fixed capital) – mere material wealth.
From the standpoint of the direct production process it [the 
saving of labor time] can be regarded as the production of fixed 
capital, this fixed capital being man himself.50
49 Kozo Uno, expressed it as the “impossibility of commodification 
of labor force”. In Uno’s theory, however, it is the cause of the crisis 
that is mainly persued as the problem of quantitative demand and 
supply of labor, and the issue of qualitative transformation of labor 
(quantification) is neglected. See also Appendix 3 at the end.
50 Grundrisse, pp.711-712.
It seems that the “social character” of labor is working 
on itself self-referentially in a mechanism whereby 
human labor originally equipped with social character 
is transformed into abstract human labor; abstract time 
– a universal medium. This is yet another effect of the 
“social character” of labor. Marx argued that surplus 
value, which is the source of profit for capitalists, is 
absolutely produced in the production process; in the 
organic composition of capital, while volumes II and III 
of Capital are dedicated to depicting how the movement 
of the merchant and money capital, which acquire relative 
or apparent independency from the movement of the 
production capital, constitutionally disguise the truth 
– the secret of the production of surplus-value. That 
the origin of the surplus-value is absolutely the “living 
labor” subsumed in the organic composition of capital 
in the production process makes it invisible not only for 
proletariats, but also for capitalists themselves. The social 
character of human labor makes itself invisible by its 
reflexivity: its essential property. In other words, human 
labor per se reinforces the objectification of the “value” 
as abstract time, that is, the abstract quantification of its 
own social character, by accepting the result of the pricing 
process of surplus value as a given fact with its own 
reflexivity51.
This is the mechanism by which the “social character 
of labor” is subsumed as “living labor” into the organic 
composition of capital, and its qualitative sociality is 
appropriated as superfluous labor time for capital. Marx 
describes the trajectory of capital such as that capital 
continues to require the appropriation of “living labor” 
as the source of surplus value, while it keeps raising its 
organic composition for continuous production of surplus 
value, that is, increasing the ratio of constant capital, and 
thereby making direct human labor increasingly obsolete 
and unnecessary. Marx calls this a “contradiction” of 
capital52.
I shall not exercise here a closer examination of 
Marx’s prophetic logic that the revolution, i.e., the 
solution of contradiction, is necessarily brought out 
from the contradiction. Rather, I am more interested 
in how the trajectory of capital could impact the form 
of human subjectivity, especially its psychological 
and ethical condition (or, existential, if you prefer). In 
Grundrisse, Marx sketches a slightly more concrete 
vision of “a different subject” who is becoming liberated 
from production relations that are contradictory to the 
production forces – a man who is becoming released from 
the organic composition of capital and domination by 
51 A theory of this process, though I shall not venture into it in this 
paper, could be developed further by using Lacan’s concept of the 
“symbolic castration” – the subsumption of the imaginary (and the 
real) by the symbolic.
52 Capital volume III, Penguin Books, p.366, p.372-373.
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“value”53. The living labor appropriated by capital will 
be transferred to machinery increasingly, and thereby 
direct human labor becomes less and less necessary. Marx 
unfolds his vision of a future society in which humans will 
enjoy more and more “disposable time”, the production 
process would no longer be a process to produce value, 
humans would not be necessary any more as providers of 
direct labor, and the individual would only step into the 
production process as a kind of free place to learn about 
the accumulated wealth of human beings (knowledge and 
technology) and further develop it. 
The first key issue is whether a release of humans from 
direct labor actually results in a liberation from domination 
by value, and secondly, what exactly does liberation 
from domination by value mean? Marx states that the 
“labor capacity” of workers is becoming transferred into 
machines, and is becoming devalued in proportion as the 
rise of the organic composition of capital. As previously 
examined, the “labor capacity” of the laborer has both a 
physical dimension and a non-physical dimension – the 
dimension of “social character”. Both of these dimensions 
are becoming unnecessary for the production process, 
and discharged from it. But the problem is whether these 
dimensions becoming unnecessary for and liberated 
from the production process necessarily means the de-
valuation (breaking with the domination of value) of “labor 
capacity”. We confirmed that it is the dimension of “social 
character” of labor capacity that produces “value”. Thus 
the question is whether the “social character” of labor 
liberated from the production process really becomes 
released from domination by “value” either, and if it does, 
what then would happen.
The question is ultimately that even if the social 
imagination of humans as the dimension of human 
desire, namely, the constitutive power of the imaginary – 
negativity III – is liberated from the capitalist production 
process, will it be freed from the commodity space? And if 
so, in what kind of constitution will negativity III become 
subsumed after it is discharged from the commodity 
space? Without a doubt, “living labor” is becoming 
reduced from the organic composition of capital in terms 
of rate, although this per se does not necessarily mean 
the absolute decrease of the total amount of direct labor 
(variable capital). Does it, however, necessarily lead to the 
abolition of value-producing labor? And another question 
could be raised that even if humans are released from 
value-producing labor, is there any possibility that humans 
could continue to be dominated by “value”? Although it 
is certain that the place where value is produced is the 
production process, it is not necessarily only in the sphere 
of production that individuals accept domination of value. 
It is also in the sphere of circulation that we are dominated 
by value. Rather, in a developed capitalist society, 
53 Grundrisse, pp.703-704, p.705, p.708, p.712.
individuals make first contact with “value” and are 
influenced by it in their encounters with the commodity, 
i.e., through their consumption. The recognition of this 
idea can already be seen in Marx.
[T]heir consumption reproduces the individual himself in a 
specific mode of being, not only in his immediate quality of 
being alive, and in specific social relations. So that the ultimate 
appropriation by individuals taking place in the consumption 
process reproduces them in the original relations in which they 
move within the production process and towards each other; 
reproduces them in their social being, and hence reproduces 
their social being -- society -- which appears as much the subject 
as the result of this great total process.54
Once a society is established in which the commodity 
globally penetrates as the universal medium, even if the 
rate of direct labor in the organic composition of capital 
is diminished, and becomes gradually absent from value 
production, as the expansion and development of the 
sphere of consumption, the subject will still continue to 
become increasingly more highly subsumed in commodity 
space. In a developed capitalist society, the “social 
character” of labor (i.e., negativity III) as the source of 
value production is becoming withdrawn from the sphere 
of production, and instead performed in the sphere of non-
material labor (monitoring and regulation), luxuries and 
fashion consumption, the various culture industries, and 
the information and communication industries. In this 
development, it appears, on the surface, that the subject 
is still stuck in its domination by “value” domination by 
“abstract labor”.
5.  A HISTORICALLY SPECIFIC FORM OF 
SOCIAL IMAGINATION
The rise of the organic composition of capital means, 
for the subject whose “social character of labor” (i.e., 
negativity III) is released from the sphere of production, 
a liberation from the social forms that constitute the 
constitution of his/her subjectivity so far. It is true that 
this is a liberation, but it is also an exile, in a way. The 
subsumption of negativity III to the capitalist mode of 
production, i.e., its transformation into abstract labor, 
has been the central axis of the social forms which 
organize subjectivity in a society which has accepted and 
developed the capitalist mode of production. The process 
of the formation of the organic composition of capital 
and its specific and dynamic trajectory is a historically-
specific social process. Yet, at the same time, it is alone 
the process of history, precisely because history is a 
product of the modern capitalist society itself, and thereby 
a historically specific being. Thus the trajectory of the 
dynamic of capital pointing beyond itself is the trajectory 
toward the end of history.
Hegel never spoke about the future, but Marx 
54 ibid., p. 717 (footnote).
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did. What is the difference? Marx pointed out that 
the movement of capital itself is a contradiction, and 
includes negativity against itself, and he conceived of 
this negativity as the future. One might say that the 
way of thinking per se in that this negativity is formed 
into the future, or projected to the future, represents the 
western sense of time generated from Judeo-Christian 
eschatology. The problem of the domination of the time 
by capitalism55 is certainly not only its abstracting aspect, 
but also the composition of the directional dynamic – time 
flowing directionally and linearly – from the negativity 
which is subsumed in the composition of capital. On 
this point, Hegel seems more cautious than Marx, if you 
read him carefully. Hegel acknowledges that history 
is a flow driven by the negativity of Spirit, and it is 
ultimately a story that is organized recursively by the 
abstract negativity of consciousness (i.e., negativity II) 
distilled from that flow itself. Thus Hegel supposedly 
did not talk about the future, since he was aware of its 
fictionality. But a limitation of Hegel may be found in 
the fact that he tried to avoid the precariousness of the 
narrativity of history: to fall into nihilism in an autotoxic 
fashion through the negativity, which it creates in itself, 
by means of glorifying the birth of Protestantism and 
German nations. This is not a solution to the problem, 
but a circulation, since he is seeking to advocate the 
process of history with historical phenomena. The most 
significant shortcoming of his method may be found in the 
following episode: within a hundred years after Hegel’s 
death, a small island country in the Far East succeeded to 
modernize itself to the extent that it declared war against 
one of the most formidable European countries; the 
Russian Empire, yet it is impossible to find any significant 
effects of Protestantism in Japanese modernization and 
capitalization. The ethics of Protestantism might have 
been a matrix for the spirit of capitalism, but once the 
system of capitalism had become independent, it would 
proceed to reproduce the sprit of capitalism in any place it 
traveled to, regardless of Christianity. This phenomenon is 
the limitation of Hegel’s theory, and can be elucidated and 
explained well by Marx’s theory. Yet on the other hand, 
a reflection on negativities through Hegel’s philosophy 
is required in order to examine just what would come at 
the end of the self-overcoming process of capital, or more 
precisely, after the dissolution of the organic composition 
of capital, since this entails imagining exactly what 
Marx’s “disposable time” would actually appear as. Here 
the Hegelian insights on time, i.e., that time was originally 
not time but negativity, become indispensable. 
Kojève narrowly concluded that the negativity at the 
55 Moishe Postone, Time, Labor, and Social Domination. Postone’s 
central theme in his book is to indicate the subsumpiton of society 
by the capitalist mode of production as a form of social domination 
by abstract labor as abstract time, which is generated as the means 
for varolization process of capital. 
bottom of Hegel’s thought was death. Nevertheless, his 
project to contemplate a relationship among death, labor, 
and history from Hegel indicates that he was trying to 
conceptualize the “human” at the end/beyond the process 
of modernity. Heidegger presumably came to be aware of 
the abyss of negativity III in Hegel, and it was then when 
he was forced to abandon his early project. He ran into the 
humanistic limitations of his own philosophy, in which 
he tried to grasp the understanding of Being by Dasein 
(human) as a future projective structure. He herewith 
stopped his writing of Being and Time. Kojève seems to 
have had a fair comprehension of this, though again, for 
him, the problem of negativity is ultimately the problem 
of death.
[T]he subject of the death in Hegel was taken up again by 
Heidegger. But since he disregarded the complementary subject 
of Struggles and Labor, his philosophy was not successful in 
explaining History—on the other hand, Marx maintains the 
subject of Struggles and Labor, and thus his philosophy is 
essentially of historicism. Yet, he disregarded the subject of the 
death (while totally admitting the mortality of human). 56
The world after history is the key issue for Kojève, 
instead of the future. He is obsessed with the concept of 
the death, ties Hegel’s idea of negativity insistently to it, 
and seems to think that Marx abandoned Hegel’s issue of 
negativity. This is the biggest shortcoming of Kojèvean 
philosophy. Death in itself is just physical extinction. 
Death itself as physical disappearance is just the same 
dimension as negativity I, i.e., the negativity of the object, 
and is irrelevant to the essence of human spirit. The issue 
here is the human idea of death, that is, the imagination 
of death, which is what makes us human. That is the 
dimension of negativity III. Kojève also does not 
disaggregate technically negativity II, that is, the simple 
negation of the natural world, and negativity III, that 
is, the sphere of creative and human action. Negativity 
III is not only a dimension of the imagination of death, 
but also a dimension of erotic phantasy, and this is the 
insight of Bataille – the limit-point where consciousness 
is lost, and where self-consciousness comes from57. 
Thus it is not impossible, indeed, rather reasonable, to 
reinterpret death in Kojève’s philosophy as negativity 
III, that is, the negation of the consciousness and the 
birthplace of the self-consciousness. It is the origin of 
Marx’s “social character” of labor. This would bring a true 
complementary reconciliation of Hegel and Marx, and 
then Heidegger would, in the end, be unnecessary.
Kojève later became conscious of the possibility that 
the human being of post-history could not be a mere 
regression to nature. Interestingly, he added a footnote to 
the second edition of his writing based on his impressions 
56 Alexandre Kojève, Introduction à la lecture de Hegel, p. 575. 
Translated by the author. This part is not included in the English 
abbreviated translation by James H. Nichols, Jr [1969].
57 See also Appendix 2 at the end of this paper.
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of travel in Japan in 1959. In this footnote, he argues 
that there is a possibility of the constitution of a human 
society that is post-human, post-labor, i.e., post-history, 
but yet not an animal world. He saw a unique microcosm 
in 1950’s Japan in which people did not have any religion, 
ethics, or politics in any European and/or historic way, but 
still not in any natural nor animalistic way. He predicted 
that the “interaction between Japan and the Western World 
will finally lead not to a rebarbarization of the Japanese 
but to a “Japanization” of the Westerners (including the 
Russians)”58. Yet, while Marx always examined issues 
on the basis of an analysis of a historically specific mode 
of the economy, Kojève discarded all of Marx’s efforts 
and heritage in his philosophy of death. It is conceivable 
now to examine the issue of detachment of “form” and 
“content” (i.e., the problem of Japanization) Kojève 
advocated as a problem of dissolution of the organic 
composition of capital: the release of variable capital from 
the capitalist mode of production; or: the dissolution of 
symbolic castration, the cancellation of subordination 
of the imaginary under the symbolic, based on Marx’s 
analysis of the historic trajectory of capital.
Since the oil crisis of 1973 and 1979, developed 
countries have entered an age of general overproduction. 
Investments into new technology, land, housing, and 
other money commodities have been tried and exercised 
in various ways in order to raise the organic composition 
of capital. In many developed countries, the number 
of non-productive population, termed “NEET”59, is 
currently increasing. Notably, the following phenomenon 
have come to coexist: a certain percentage of the non-
productive population which does not participate in the 
sphere of production and depends on already accumulated 
wealth, and, domination by value with the extreme 
development of the commodity sphere. This must have a 
certain effect on our subjectivities. In Japan, the suicide 
rate increased, especially after the collapse of the Japanese 
asset price bubble (between 1986 to 1991). This especially 
true for middle-aged and elderly males, who were not, so 
it is said, able to adapt themselves to the changing social 
environment after the collapse of the long dominant socio-
economic mode of production since 1940’s60. Many in the 
58 Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the reading of Hegel: Lectures 
on the Phenomenology of Spirit, translated by James H. Nichols, Jr 
[1969], Cornell University Press, 1980, p.161-162 [Footnote].
59 “NEET is a term coined by the govt. to describe people currently 
“Not in Education, Employment, or Training”. It was first used 
in the United Kingdom, but its use has spread to other countries, 
including Japan, China, and South Korea.” (http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/NEET)
60 There is a widely received theory, the so-called “1940 System” 
advanced by Yukio Noguchi, one of the most famous ex-bureaucrat 
economist in Japan. According to Noguchi, the Japanese economic 
system, including the “convoy method”—a bureaucrat-lead 
monetary system, had basically not changed since its establishment 
in the 1940s, all the way through to the 1990s (with Japanese WWII 
defeat in 1945 having no impact), until the crash of the Japanese 
asset price bubble. Yukio Noguchi, “The 1940 System: Japan under 
younger generation are becoming “Freeters”61, “NEETs”, 
“Hikikomori”62, “Parasite Singles”63, jobless university 
graduates, and graduate students who have no chance to 
get a career-based form of employment64. As previously 
stated, there are great concerns about their growing 
sense of stagnation in society. In European countries 
and in the United States, there is a tendency in that the 
problem of surplus labor population emerges as an issue 
of discrimination, or disparity, by class, race, faith, and 
language, and is recognized and addressed according to 
such indications. On the other hand, there seems to be a 
tendency in Asian countries, such as Japan, Korea, and 
Taiwan, to recognize this as a problem of the generation 
of pure surplus-labor population, because of the relatively 
high homogeneity of society. In Japan’s case, it is notable 
that the progress of the liberation/exile from value-
creating labor is highly visible in its pure form as the 
result of: growing overseas outsourcing, a high rate of 
replacement of direct human labor with industrial robots, 
the declining birthrate and aging population, the ongoing 
severe employment situation, and the shortage of social 
liquidity mainly caused by ossified hiring customs. It is a 
distinctive characteristic of contemporary Japanese society 
that the change of the organic composition of capital since 
1970 is eliciting a peculiar development of the imaginary 
character in commodity space. Negativity III, which was 
once in the form of social character of labor, has been 
unleashed into the extraordinarily developed sphere of 
consumption, such as fashion, pop/idol music, various 
genres of subculture (manga, anime, light novels, video 
games), etc. It is difficult to find signs of revolutionary 
movement, or the appearance of a revolutionary subject, 
even while feelings of social stagnation are swelling.
A leading Japanese cultural critic from the younger 
generation, Hiroki Azuma (a Derridean), explains the 
rise of otaku65 cultures (subcultures) with the term 
the Wartime Economy”, The American Economic Review, Vol. 88, 
No. 2, May, 1998. (http://www.jstor.org/pss/116956)
61 “Freeter is a Japanese expression for people between the ages 
of 15 and 34 who lack full time employment or are unemployed 
(excluding housewives and students).” (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Freeter)
62 “Hikikomori is a Japanese term which refers to the phenomenon 
of reclusive people who have chosen to withdraw from social 
life, often seeking extreme degrees of isolation and confinement 
because of various personal and social factors in their lives.” (http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hikikomori)
63 “Parasite single is a Japanese term for a single person who lives 
with their parents until their late twenties or early thirties in order to 
enjoy a carefree and comfortable life.” (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Parasite_single)
64 Graduates and graduate students tend to lose their best chance 
to get jobs at major companies in Japan because of the persistence 
of an idiosyncratic Japanese recruiting custom, known as the 
“simultaneous recruiting of new graduates.” (http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Simultaneous_recruiting_of_new_graduates)
65 “Otaku is a Japanese term used to refer to people with obsessive 
interests, particularly anime, manga, or video games.” (http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Otaku)
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“animalization”66. Although his theory has numerous 
merits as a study of culture and representation, it 
fails to make, in the same manner as S. Žižek and J. 
Butler, in principle, any definite distinctions between 
corporeal desire (animal nature) and imaginative desire 
(the dimension of human desire, or negativity III). 
Accordingly, Azuma inadvertently reduces the problem 
of Japanese snobbism, which Kojève distinguished from 
American animalism (as one of two possible modes of 
human being of post-modern era), into a form of “cynicism 
(against modernity)”. He also argues that Japan will be 
equally “animalized” along with the U.S. after it passes 
through its transitional stage of cynicism. In his theory, 
the particularity of the rise of the imaginative domain in 
contemporary Japan is explained only with psychoanalytic 
mechanisms (such as “repression” or “psychological 
trauma”) that come from the Meiji Restoration (1868) 
and Japan’s defeat in WWII (1945) – the consequence is 
that any sort of socio-historical theoretical frame is not 
provided by Azuma. In the first place, Kojève’s idea of 
“snobbism” as such was just a comment on a footnote, 
inspired by his trip to Japan in 1950’s, and its conceptual 
definition is indeed not clearly elaborated. It seems that 
Kojève had an insight from his observation of Japanese 
society and culture that a human condition in which some 
human negativity is still retained while having already 
stepped out of the forms of Human or History à la the West 
is possible. The challenge for us remains in developing 
this insight on the basis of our reading of Hegel-Marx to 
reroute it back to the theory of the dimension of human 
desire (or negativity III) which Kojève himself originally 
found. Though we cannot fully elaborate it here, based 
on the hitherto developed consideration in this paper, it 
should be a theory elucidating in what mode the negativity 
brewed in the composition of social forms of capitalist 
modernity (i.e., the organic composition of capital) would 
appear when it is liberated from that composition as such. 
In this view, in terms of the end of modernity (i.e., the end 
of history), Kojève’s theories are overly Hegelian (rather 
than Marxian), as are Azuma’s, who is overly Kojèvean; 
both lack a social theory of what kind of socio-historical 
constitution is generating History, and how the end of this 
“History” is to come about.
Though I indeed argued in the course of this discussion 
the importance of coming back to the Hegelian knowledge 
of negativity, Marxian theory is crucially important at 
the same time, since it can help answer by what kind of 
social forms human negativity is constituted to generate 
modernity, capitalism, and history. The amalgamation of 
Hegel and Marx this way would enable us to graduate 
66 Hiroki Azuma, Dobutsuka suru posutomodan: otaku kara mita 
nihon shakai, Kodansha Gendai Shinsho, 2001 (Engish trans. Otaku: 
Japan’s Database Animals, University of Minnesota Press, 2009). 
See also “The Animalization of Otaku Culture”, Mechademia 2, 
2007, p.175-188.
from a cultural and representational theory that is always 
fixating on and interpreting “edgy” and extreme cultural 
events or problems of subjectivity as a picture of the 
whole, and then, instead, to move up to a social theory 
which understands such events as a specific part of a 
whole structure.
Certainly the appropriation of direct human labor 
(variable capital) by Japanese capital is being exercised 
outside the borders of Japan, while domestic prosperity 
in the imaginary sphere continues. Examining the 
global movement of international capital, the organic 
composition of capital is maintained as a whole. Here, 
cross-border expansion and transition of capital proceeds, 
but the domestic labor force does not freely enjoy such 
mobility. What this means is that people in a developed 
country like Japan are becoming liberated from the organic 
composition of capital, but meanwhile remain under the 
domination of value in the commodity sphere, since the 
organic composition as a global whole of capital remains. 
In such a geo-social-economic matrix, social imagination 
(negativity III) itself runs idle. It does not work towards 
social productivity, but instead forms cultural phantasms. 
The condition of the “end of the history” that Kojève once 
envisioned as yet to come has turned out to be exactly 
this historically specific phenomenon of the trajectory of 
capital in contemporary east Asia.
I would now like to posit the following hypothesis on 
the sense of stagnation and hopelessness in contemporary 
Japan. Due to the rise of the organic composition of 
capital, the social character of labor is formed and 
developed not only in terms of the mental aspects of labor, 
but also as a source of social and historic imagination, in 
accordance with the development of capitalism. However, 
in a region (Japan) where geographical movement of labor 
force over its boarders does not occur, instead of being 
exercised as a social and historic imagination toward a 
hopeful future vision, this faculty is fulfilled as: romantic 
imagination which goes introspectively, to a further dive 
into the interiority; or retrospectively, toward a nostalgic 
beautification of the past. An expression of this is the rise 
of the sphere of subculture in Japanese society. Thus, the 
social character of labor, liberated from the production 
sphere, is turned into to cultural consumption, and, 
as a result, subjects still cannot freely emerge from a 
commodity space dominated by value. This accounts for 
their lack of hope.
Hardt/Negri argued that the geographical movement 
of workers is an essential factor for an emancipation of 
potentiality of multitude, and applaud the migrations of 
workers. 
Mass migrations have become necessary for production. Every 
path is forged, mapped, and traveled. It seems that the more 
intensely each is traveled and the more suffering is deposited 
there, the more each path becomes productive. These paths are 
what bring the “earthly city” out of the cloud and confusion that 
Empire casts over it. This is how the multitude gains the power 
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to affirm its autonomy, traveling and expressing itself through an 
apparatus of widespread, transversal territorial reappropriation.67
On the whole, the flow of Japanese migration remains 
weak. Granted, there has been an increase in the number 
of young people who enter universities abroad from 
countries like South Korea and Taiwan (which share 
many characteristics in common with Japan, such as: 
a high degree of development in the technological and 
information industries, a scarcity of natural resources, and 
limited size of territory), but Japanese university students 
are said to be increasingly inactive in recent years due to 
anxiety related to the uncertain prospects of the domestic 
economy. Company workers also tend, more than in the 
past, to avoid overseas assignments for the same reason. 
The government still maintains tightly controlled, non-
progressive, immigration policies. Does the cause of the 
immobility of Japanese labor force originate in: language 
difficulties, geographical isolation, a history of closed-
door policies, or Japan’s defeat in WWII? This paper 
will not venture further into a sociological analysis of 
the social and psychological factors that prevent Japan 
from pursuing more progressive forms of migration (both 
emigrating to other countries, and accepting immigrants 
to Japan). However, it remains clear that Japan remains an 
obdurate historical locality or specificity that Hardt/Negri 
are incapable of handling, due to their lack of a robust 
principle theory.
6.  CONCLUDING REMARKS
The conclusion of this paper is not to propose to young 
people in Japan a simple general solution (such as “go 
abroad!”). While some support neoliberalism and the 
attendant promotion of liquidity and abolition of the 
“nationality” of labor force and capital in order to revive 
the central economy in Japan, others in contrast are 
looking towards (for example) community-rebuilding as a 
new form of society in this era of slow economic growth. 
What I mean by a “robust principle theory” is one which 
is able to clearly articulate that both of these seemingly 
opposite arguments and policies are indeed contained 
within a single common structure in that they are both 
trying to point out the problem of the re-appropriation 
or re-subsumption of our socio-historical imagination, 
which is being liberated from the highly-advanced organic 
composition of capital. More than anything, such a theory 
is what is most needed from social theory. 
It seems to me possible to extract a principle theory68 
of transformation of subjectivity in the trajectory of capital 
67 Hardt and Negri, ibid., p, 398.
68 See also Appendix 3 to know how this principle theory is different 
from a “principle theory” of Kozo Uno.
from Marx’s theory. (Japan’s case is here shown as an 
illustrative example.69) In this paper, every effort has been 
made to avoid reverting to a Messianic vision, like Hardt/
Negri (and Žižek), or just following up changes in society 
with “critique” without actually treating the phenomenon 
critically, like Azuma. Indeed, until now, a theory on the 
nature of negativity, that is, the drive of history, and on 
the historical and social forms that subsume it, has been 
sorely lacking. This paper will serve as an experimental 
demonstration of this possibility, tracking back to Hegel’s 
negativity, that Marx’s theory on the organic composition 
of capital also potentially contains the dimension of a 
principle theory of the transformation of subjectivity. 
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symptom for developed capitalist countries. See Anne Allison, 
Precarious Japan, Duke University Press, 2013.
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APPENDIXES
Appendix 1
Generally speaking, the secret of the formation of the 
capitalist contradiction and development of the process 
of valorization may be found in the penetration of the 
circulation process into the production process. Thus, it is 
conceivable that someone might imagine he can initiate 
liberation from this contradiction by an interception 
of this penetration. Kojin Karatani tried to realize 
this idea. His revolutionary activities were planned to 
prevent the penetration of circulation into the production 
process on the front lines by means of introduction of a 
local currency (NAM), which would circulate initially 
within the intellectual community. Putting aside the 
practical problems of this project for now, a significant 
theoretical problem is that Karatani understands capitalist 
contradiction as a contradiction between the processes 
of production and circulation. In contrast, Moishe 
Postone (University of Chicago) provides an alternative 
interpretation of contradiction in Capital, in which 
contradiction does not arise between the processes of 
circulation and production, but within the production 
process alone. According to this Postonean interpretation, 
Marx actually discussed the circulation and reproduction 
process of capital (or merchant capital and monetary 
capital) in his manuscripts of the second and third volume 
of Capital, but this was only to demonstrate how the 
appearance of the circulation and reproduction process 
covers and obscures the essence of the dynamic and 
contradictory self-movement of the production process 
(industrial capital) per se. This paper is founded on this 
interpretation. The contradiction of capitalism is that while 
capital promotes a rise of the organic composition of 
capital, or a relative reduction of variable capital through 
technological innovations, it continuously requires a 
subsumption of direct labor under its organic composition 
as a source of surplus value. I argued above that the 
production process is, in capitalism, penetrated by the 
circulation process. I hold that this penetration is not a sort 
of phenomenon which is reversible after its formation. In 
fact, the relationship between production and circulation 
process in capitalism is separable only by conceptual 
articulation, and it is impossible to unravel its fabric of 
interactive formation process, which is woven through 
the real process of history, back into single threads. 
Metaphorically speaking, it would be far easier to extract 
a drop of dye from a glass of water into which it has been 
diluted. Once formed, the capitalist production process is 
essentially and intrinsically permeated by the circulation 
process, and it has become a self-moving process, having 
internalized the latter. Or, it can conversely be said that 
the circulation process has its existence only when it is 
extracted conceptually from the capitalist production 
process, and thus any attempt to hypostatize it and 
separate it from the production process is fundamentally 
misguided. Therefore, if a revolution is possible, it 
should be a revolution of the production process per se. 
In other words, it should be an overcoming of the social 
constitution of the organic composition of capital. This 
very idea is the thrust of Marx’s Capital. Thus, from this 
point of view, a mutual-permeation of production and 
circulation process originates from the double character 
of human labor, which is that it has two dimensions (of 
a material and social character), and it appears as the 
double character of commodity. The double character of 
labor is the source of the double character of commodity, 
and not the other way around. The reason Marx started 
with a discussion of the double character of commodity 
at the beginning of Capital vol.1 and then mentioned the 
strange phenomenon of “salto mortale” is that he adopted 
a particular method of phenomenology that begins with a 
phenomenon, and then traces back to the mechanism of its 
development. In this view, Karatani’s attempt to overcome 
the duality of labor by the dissolution of the duality of 
currency as a representative of commodities is obviously 
a non-Marxist one. Of course, Karatani himself was aware 
of the non-Marxist character of his own thought and 
project, since he labeled himself a Proudhonist. 
Appendix 2
I pursued the problem of negativity III from another point 
of view in my doctoral dissertation: “Organism and the 
Element of ‘Earth’: An Interpretation of the Idea of 
Organism in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit” (2007: 
Waseda University)70. In this examination, both alongside 
the construction of Phenomenology itself, and from 
outside it, I undertook to interpret the nature of the 
element of “Earth”, which appears in the discourse of 
Phenomenology several times in a significant and peculiar 
way. The element of Earth seems to possess negativity 
sufficient to metamorphose the nature of consciousness, 
and therefore, it is something different from consciousness 
itself and is, at the same time, not any element from the 
natural world, since, as we have seen, any natural 
elements cannot resist the negativity of consciousness, 
and are to be penetrated by it, according to Hegel. This 
element of Earth seems to have an impenetrability, which 
cannot be appropriated instantly or fully by the negativity 
of consciousness. In short, the element of Earth is 
something between consciousness and nature, or a kind of 
dimension in-between the spiritual and the material. This 
element of Earth, in my interpretation, represents Hegel’s 
70 This work was published with the title: “Ishiki to Seimei: Hegel 
Seishin-Genshou-Gaku ni okeru yuukitai to ‘chi’ no eremento 
wo meguru kousatsu [Consciousness and Life: An Interpretation 
of the Idea of Organism and the Element of ‘Earth’ in Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of Spirit]” (Shakai-Hyouronsha, 2010). Currently 
available only in Japanese. The author was awarded the 2011 HAJ 
(Hegel Association Japan) Prize for his achievements, including this 
publication.
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negativity III. Hegel himself, oddly enough, did not offer 
any explanation about what it really is. It appears suddenly 
at several turning points of Phenomenology, without any 
further justification. I examined all of appearances related 
to the element of Earth, and investigated the way it 
functions in the structure of Phenomenology. I concluded 
that the element of Earth is one dimension of human 
mind—something in the human mind associated with 
characters as non-natural, non-conscious, non-reasonable, 
vital, and female. Interpreted apart from Hegel per se, it 
could be identified with Kojève’s “dimension of human 
desire”— a dimension of assimilation, Lacan’s “the 
imaginary”—the desire for the Other’s desire, Adorno/
Horkheimer’s dimension of “mimesis”—the power of 
prehistoric magic, Takaaki Yoshimoto’s dimension of 
“Tsui-Gensou”—reciprocal fantasy71. This dimension, 
called by the name of Earth, plays its role at the significant 
turning points of Hegel’s Phenomenology, for example, at 
the transition from Consciousness to Self-Consciousness 
and also from Reason to Spirit ,  though its most 
remarkable work is seen at the section of the Observation 
of the organic in the chapter of Reason. “The organic” is 
explained as a phenomenon constituted by human mind, 
which holds unconsciously the element of Earth at the 
bottom of itself. My point here is that Hegel had already 
attempted to criticize and deconstruct the idea of the 
“organic” at the beginning of nineteenth century, 
regarding it as a phenomenon of Spirit using the method 
of phenomenology. In doing this, Hegel inadvertently 
inser ted the element  of  Earth when he fel t  the 
consciousness need to encounter something that would be 
impenetrable by his negativity. The conclusion of my 
doctoral thesis is that this element of Earth represents the 
non-natural ,  the spiri tual  negativity,  in Hegel’s 
philosophical constitution in Phenomenology. Capturing 
the Earth in Hegel’s Phenomenology as such, we can see 
that something different from both human reason (Kant) 
and primordial nature (Schelling) is working at the core of 
71 In Japan, Takaaki Yoshimoto (1924-2012), who is a famous poet, 
literary critic, and philosopher, has already set forth his original 
theory in his work Kyodo Gensou Ron in 1968, inspired by Hegel 
and early Marx, in which the domain of “Tsui-Gensou” (reciprocal 
fantasy) is observed at work in the fundamental layer of Japanese 
social construction since mythological times. The power of the state 
comes into existence at the occasion that this realm – interpersonal 
and spiritual erotic fantasy – is incorporated into the symbolic 
system of society called “Kyoudou Gensou” (communal fantasy). 
The zenith of his theory is that this domain of “Tsui-Gensou” is still 
functioning in a much more overt way in Japan, despite Japan’s 
apparent successful modernization, than in Western society. It is 
interesting that Yoshimoto’s theory explains much of the essential 
characteristics and unique aspects of Japanese culture and social 
habitus, although he doesn’t employ mature Marx’s method of 
hisotorical analysis on social forms but a method much closer to 
romanticism. Yet another interesting fact is that his book Kyodo 
Gensou Ron is said to be one of the publications which had the 
greatest ideological influence on 1968 generation in Japan. Takaaki 
Yoshimoto, Kyodo Gensou Ron (1968), Kadokawa Bunko Sophia, 
1982.
Hegel’s thought as the ground which brings about the 
movement of Spirit. Thus, Hegel, who took a unique line, 
maintaining a distance from both Kantian rational theory 
of organism and Romantic naturalistic theory of organism, 
came to find, as a result, the organic as society, which is 
neither reasonable nor natural. At the same time, Hegel 
faithfully inherited the Kantian method of transcendental 
philosophy; he analytically regards “the organic” as a 
“phenomenon” that the multilayered constitution of the 
human mind brings about, not as a kind of primordial 
being outside the human. Hegel carried out a Kantian 
project of transcendental subject by his “consciousness” 
and went even further than Kant by understanding even 
faculties in humans, such as Perception, Understanding, 
and Reason as a “phenomenon”. This point of view 
enables Hegel’s consciousness to see or sense something 
negat ive  aga ins t  i t  in  i t se l f .  By in t roducing  a 
phenomenological methodology in which Hegel sets up 
this kind of point of view as a leading character of 
discourse, he could attain a unique position from which he 
could criticize both Kantian and Romantic theory of 
organism in Phenomenology. The vector in the latter half 
of Phenomenology actually shows his tendency toward 
logic as a metaphysics, which is later explicitly written 
(Science of Logic, 1812-16). This is exactly the opposite 
direction of the later Schelling, who went into a project to 
see positively something primordial at the bottom of 
nature, reason, spirit, or life. Hegel simply suggested 
something non-conscious and negative against conscious, 
in a negative way, which works at the bottom of 
consciousness. He showed that the interaction of the 
conscious and the non-conscious generates a variety of 
modes of human consciousness (a form of consciousness 
which sees an organism in nature is one of them), and then 
he moved toward a  conceptual  f ramework of  a 
metaphysics whereby the trajectory of movement of 
consciousness is abstracted into the categories of logic 
and existence. The core of the organic phenomenon—
which is called the element of Earth—is left as a blank. In 
the 20th century, Georges Bataille in Inner Experience 
(1943) conceived that it is the dimension of communion 
with others—sympathy, la communication—that Hegel 
placed at the bottom of his philosophy and depended on, 
but ran away from, eventually. Bataille compared it to the 
“earth” and also called it the “extreme limit” where the 
self is lost. He admires Hegel, saying that Hegel could 
touch upon this holy limit of ecstasy, while condemning 
Hegel for turning away from it. All of Hegel’s efforts to 
build up a system or history were done out of an attempt 
to escape from this limit, Bataille penetratingly observed72. 
On the other hand, Eugen Fink in Sein und Mensch (1977) 
refuted Heidegger, who criticized Hegel’s concept of 
experience as too subjective and self-conscious and also 
72 Georges Bataille, Inner Experience (1943), translated by Leslie 
Anne Boldt, State University of New York Press, 1988, p.41, 78.
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discussed that Hegelian philosophy lacks the moment of 
“Earth”73. It is, however, Heidegger himself that is 
incapable of feeling and seeing into the element of Earth 
at the bottom of Hegel’s philosophy, according to Fink. 
Fink argued that  there is  the Earth—something 
impenetrable for human thinking in Hegel’s concept of 
experience or existence in a speechless and hidden way. 
Heidegger tries to locate Hegel’s philosophy at the summit 
of the history of the forgetting of being, and the 
completion of modern metaphysics. Fink, however, 
insisted that Hegel is not yet beyond modern metaphysics, 
and that he is attempting to reconstruct metaphysics 
between the ancient and modern eras. In this regard, 
Hegel has the same ontological motif of human experience 
as Heidegger, though the directionalities of both are, in 
some ways, different. What, Michel Foucault argued, was 
enclosed and oppressed by “bio-politique” in modern 
society after the 19th century is—though Foucault never 
talked about it directly till the very end of his life—the 
very self-same negativity III, I would say, that sparkles as 
a symbol of Earth in Hegel’s Phenomenology. The 
worshiping of the vital that has been repeated from 
Bergson to Negri/Hardt is nothing but an attempt to 
enshrine this negativity III in a transhistorical way. In 
contrast ,  i t  is  early Marx that grasped the most 
appropriately the true identity of Hegel’s negativity III. 
He put an emphasis on this negative dimension as a 
“species-life (Gattungsleben)”, which is different from 
nature and also precedent to consciousness. Marx 
discussed in Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts 
(1844) a two-stage process of alienation: first, an 
alienation from nature itself, and then, an alienation from 
human nature. The human being is alienated from nature 
itself as a result of the formation of a sphere of species-
life as his own constitution, and living there. “The animal 
is immediately one with its life activity. It does not 
distinguish itself from it. It is its life activity. Man makes 
his life activity itself the object of his will and of his 
consciousness. He has conscious life activity. It is not a 
determination with which he directly merges. Conscious 
life activity distinguishes man immediately from animal 
life activity. It is just because of this that he is a species-
being. Or it is only because he is a species-being that he is 
a conscious being, i.e., that his own life is an object for 
him. Only because of that is his activity free activity. 
Estranged labor reverses the relationship, so that it is just 
because man is a conscious being that he makes his life 
activity, his essential being, a mere means to his 
existence.”74 Humans broke with nature as a result of the 
73 Martin Heidegger, The Basic Writings, “The Origin of the Work 
of Art. (1935–1936)”,,Eng. trans. David Farrell Krell. Revised and 
expanded ed. Harper Collins, 2008, p.139-212.
74 Karl Marx, Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte: Heft I, Karl 
Marx Werke/Artikel/Entwürfe März 1843 bis August 1844 [MEGA, 
Erste Abteilung, Bd.2], Dietz Verlag, 1982, S.240-241. (Eng. trans. 
by Martin Mulligan, 1959: http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/
constitution of their species-life, and have become one 
large consciousness, which enables humans to objectify 
nature. Then, individual consciousnesses were generated 
through alienated labor, which enabled humans to be on a 
stage where they can objectify society. If we compare it 
with the constitution of Hegel’s Phenomenology, Marx 
considers, in a reversed way, that “The Ethical Life 
(Ethical World)” is firstly formed, and then a relationship 
of “Lordship and Bondage” is experienced, which 
produces a “Consciousness”. Although early Marx had not 
ye t  thought  of  a  soc ia l  and  h is tor ica l  form of 
objectification of labor, it was his great success to be able 
to talk about Hegel’s negativity III in a positive way, 
differing from Schelling. 
Appendix 3
Kozo Uno, who is a Japanese economist and is considered 
to be one of the most important theorists in the field of 
Marx’s theory of value, developed an original framework 
within which to interpret Capital known as “Uno riron 
(Uno theory)”. He argued that it is essential to distinguish 
studies which deal with the extraction of a pure form of 
the dynamic trajectory of capital from Marx’s narration in 
Capital, from studies which deal with specific forms in the 
realization of the capitalist mode of production in various 
historically specific situations; the former is a principle 
theory of pure capitalism (his priority concern) and the 
latter is a general theory of historical development of 
capitalism and an analytical theory of present details of the 
capitalist economy. A central motivation of Uno’s theory 
is presumably in both a) understanding objectively our 
mode of being through an elucidation of the fundamental 
logic of the development of capital, which is a process 
of history per se, and b) the establishment of a method to 
handle the concrete social situations in which it is actually 
developed. Uno considered that the movement of capital 
cannot produce labor force in itself, and therefore it 
depends on externals to the system for the supply of labor 
force. This is termed the impossibility (difficulty) of the 
commodification of the labor force. This externality of 
the labor force is considered to be a root of contradiction 
of capitalism, and a cause of economic crisis75. However, 
as I noted in footnote 49, a quantitative balance of supply 
and demand of labor force is the key for Uno, as it is the 
cause of crisis, and thereby the problem of qualitative 
transformation of labor (quantification of labor) is beyond 
the scope of his consideration. Uno does not take up the 
question of the qualitative determination of labor, i.e., 
what is labor in the first place? The “pure capitalism”, 
which is his theoretically perfect example of capitalism, 
regulates for itself the supply amount of labor force by 
maintaining a rotation of crisis and boom. In this way, 
works/1844/manuscripts/labour.htm)
75 Kozo Uno, Principles of Political Economy. Theory of a Purely 
Capitalist Society. Translated by Thomas T. Sekine. Brighton, 1980.
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for Uno, capitalism is a system which has internalized 
the outside, and thereby will never collapse in its pure 
form. This is in total opposition to Marx’s idea that capital 
necessarily proceeds on a trajectory toward self-collapse. 
Further, Uno’s externality of labor power remains the 
quantitative determination, and the relation between 
the accumulation (constant capital) and the qualitative 
transformation of human labor is not considered. In 
these terms, Moishe Postone’s theory, which elucidates 
the relation of the quantification of human labor and the 
trajectory of capital in faithful accordance with Marx’s 
logic, seems to grasp more profoundly the project of 
Capital than Uno’s theory, since the superiority of 
Marx’s theory is found in the fact that it is a theory of 
subjectivity, as well as a theory of the objective dimension 
of social forms. Based on this acknowledgement, this 
paper suggests a principle theory of transformation of 
subjectivity in the trajectory of capital. 
